An experiment is described that tested whether stimulus-response associations or an abstract rule are automatized during extensive practice at perceptual categorization. Twenty-seven participants each completed 12,300 trials of perceptual categorization, either on rule-based (RB) categories that could be learned explicitly or information-integration (II) categories that required procedural learning. Each participant practiced predominantly on a primary category structure, but every third session they switched to a secondary structure that used the same stimuli and responses. Half the stimuli retained their same response on the primary and secondary categories (the congruent stimuli) and half switched responses (the incongruent stimuli). Several results stood out. First, performance on the primary categories met the standard criteria of automaticity by the end of training. Second, for the primary categories in the RB condition, accuracy and response time (RT) were identical on congruent and incongruent stimuli. In contrast, for the primary II categories, accuracy was higher and RT was lower for congruent than for incongruent stimuli. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that rules are automatized in RB tasks, whereas stimulus-response associations are automatized in II tasks. A cognitive neuroscience theory is proposed that accounts for these results.
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Introduction
There is now abundant evidence that declarative and procedural memory systems both contribute to perceptual category learning (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2005 , 2010 Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004; Reber, Gitelman, Parrish, & Mesulam, 2003) . Much of this evidence comes from rule-based (RB) and informationintegration (II) category-learning tasks. In RB tasks, the categories can be learned via some explicit reasoning process (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998). In the most common applications, only one stimulus dimension is relevant, and the participant's task is to discover this relevant dimension and then to map the different dimensional values to the relevant categories. In II tasks, accuracy is maximized only if information from two or more incommensurable stimulus components is integrated at some predecisional stage (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Ashby et al., 1998) . Fig. 1 shows typical examples of RB and II tasks. In both cases, the two categories are composed of circular sine-wave gratings that vary in the width and orientation of the dark and light bars. The solid lines denote the category boundaries. Note that a simple verbal rule perfectly partitions the categories in the RB task, but no verbal rule correctly separates the two categories in the II task. A variety of evidence suggests that success in RB tasks depends on declarative memory systems and especially on working memory and executive attention (Ashby et al., 1998; Maddox, Ashby, Ing, & Pickering, 2004; Waldron & Ashby, 2001; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006) , whereas success in II tasks depends on procedural learning that is mediated largely within the striatum (Ashby & Ennis, 2006; Filoteo, Maddox, Salmon, & Song, 2005; Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996; Nomura et al., 2007) .
Although many studies have reported empirical dissociations between RB and II learning, much less is known about the automatic performance of RB and II categorization decisions. The few available studies have failed to find any qualitative differences between automatic RB and II categorization (Hélie, Roeder, & Ashby, 2010; Hélie, Waldschmidt, & Ashby, 2010; Waldschmidt & Ashby, 2011) , and as a result Ashby and Crossley (2012) tentatively proposed that there may be only one neural system for mediating automatic behaviors. This article describes an extensive behavioral experiment that reports the first known difference between automatic RB and II categorization. In particular, we report evidence that stimulus-response (SR) associations are automatized in II tasks, whereas rules are automatized in RB tasks.
In previous studies of RB and II automaticity conducted in our lab, every participant was trained either on an II category structure or on one of two different RB structures for almost 14,000 trials http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.04.005 0010-0277/Ó 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
